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Abstract
Current training pipelines for machine learning (ML) based
malware classification rely on crowdsourced threat feeds,
exposing a natural attack injection point. We study for the first
time the susceptibility of ML malware classifiers to backdoor
poisoning attacks, specifically focusing on challenging
“clean label” attacks where attackers do not control the
sample labeling process. We propose the use of techniques
from explainable machine learning to guide the selection
of relevant features and their values to create a watermark
in a model-agnostic fashion. Using a dataset of 800,000
Windows binaries, we demonstrate effective attacks against
gradient boosting decision trees and a neural network model
for malware classification under various constraints imposed
on the attacker. For example, an attacker injecting just 1%
poison samples in the training process can achieve a success
rate greater than 97% by crafting a watermark of 8 features
out of more than 2,300 available features. To demonstrate the
feasibility of our backdoor attacks in practice, we create a
watermarking utility for Windows PE files that preserves the
binary’s functionality. Finally, we experiment with potential
defensive strategies and show the difficulties of completely
defending against these powerful attacks, especially when the
attacks blend in with the legitimate sample distribution.
1 Introduction
With the shift of the endpoint security industry towards adopt-
ing machine learning (ML) based tools, we are witnessing
a corresponding increase in the attention dedicated by the
security research community towards adversarial attacks
against malicious software (malware) detection models.
Recently, successful evasion attacks against commercial
ML based anti-virus systems have made the news [5], and
even public competitions have been organized to test the
security of open source models [3]. For the moment, however,
the vast majority of researchers’ focus has been on evasion
attacks [11, 24, 48], where the goal of the attacker is to alter
the data point (in this case the malware binary) at inference
time in order to induce a misclassification. Our work, on the
other hand, focuses on poisoning attacks [12], which attempt
to influence the ML training process. A particularly interesting
subset of poisoning attacks is backdoor [26] poisoning, where
the adversary places a carefully chosen watermark into the
feature space such that the victim model learns to associate
its presence with a class of the attacker’s choice. Backdoor
attacks have been shown to be extremely effective when
applied to computer vision models [20, 34], without requiring
a large number of poisoned examples, but their applicability
to the malware classification domain remained uncertain.
A basic necessity for such an attack to be carried out
is the ability of the adversary to tamper with a subset of
the training data of the victim model. We argue that the
current training pipeline of many security vendors provides
a remarkably natural injection point for a resourceful attacker.
Security companies, in fact, often rely on crowd-sourced
threat feeds [1, 4, 6, 7] to provide them with a large, diverse,
stream of data to train their classifiers. This is chiefly due
to the sheer quantity of labeled binaries needed to achieve
satisfactory detection performances by ML models (tens to
hundreds of millions), which makes it hard for vendors to rely
exclusively on in-house data sources. Since these threat feeds
are largely built around user-submitted binaries, they provide
an ideal vector for poisoning attacks.
One key difference between the computer vision domain
and malware classifiers is the lack of control over the labels
assigned to the samples. The labels included in crowd-sourced
threat feeds are, in fact, automatically generated by applying
several malware detection engines. It would therefore be ex-
tremely hard for an attacker to control the output of such a com-
mittee of automated systems. That is why we assume the adver-
sary has no control over the labels assigned to the samples. In
this paper, therefore, we study for the first time the susceptibil-
ity of ML-based malware classifiers against clean-label back-
door attacks [44, 51]. We develop novel, model-agnostic back-
door attacks, that are feasible to mount in practice and maintain
the attacks’ undetectability under existing mitigations.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
01
03
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 M
ar 
20
20
Users submit binaries to 
crowdsourced threat intelligence 
platforms for evaluation. 
Attacker submits poisoned 
benign files.
The platforms collect data 
and assign labels.
The company obtains the outsourced data and 
uses it in the training of a ML malware classifier.
Attacker can now submit malware 
containing the same backdoor. The 
model will be fooled into recognizing it 
as benign.
Gathering 
& Labeling
Outsourced data Proprietary data
Preprocessing & 
Feature Extraction
Model training
ML malware 
classifier
Figure 1: Overview of the attack on the training pipeline for static machine learning malware classifiers.
Our attacks inject watermarked benign samples in the train-
ing set of a malware detector, with the goal of changing the
prediction of malicious software samples watermarked with
the same pattern at inference time. To unbind the attack strategy
from the specifics of the ML model, our main insight is to lever-
age tools from ML explainability, namely SHapley Additive
exPlanations (SHAP) [35], to select a small set of highly rele-
vant features and their values for creating the watermark. As a
practical testbed for our experimentations we employ the gradi-
ent boosting LightGBM [28] model released alongside the EM-
BER [10] dataset, as well as a neural network model of our own
design, called EmberNN. We develop a suite of attack strate-
gies, that are effective under various threat models, including
very realistic ones. To demonstrate feasibility of our attacks in
practice, we develop a watermark utility that can implement the
watermark patterns in both malicious and benign files, while
preserving their functionalities. Finally, we evaluate several
potential mitigation techniques, and show how one of our strate-
gies remains undetectable under all tested defensive measures.
To summarize, our paper proposes the following contri-
butions: (i) We highlight a natural attack point which, if left
unguarded, may be used to compromise the training pipelines
of commercial ML malware detection products. (ii) We
propose a novel, model-agnostic methodology for injecting
backdoors in malware classification models using explainable
machine learning techniques. Our attacks are effective against
both ensemble and neural network models, and can be adapted
to satisfy different adversarial constraints. (iii) We show one of
the first backdoor poisoning attacks against gradient boosting
decision trees, and demonstrate that a small amount of poisoned
samples (1% size of training) with a watermark of 8 features
out of 2351 is sufficient to reach an attack success rate of more
than 97%. (iv) We demonstrate that the backdoor attacks are
feasible in practice by developing a watermarking utility for
Windows PE files that preserves functionality. (v) Finally, we
evaluate several mitigation techniques, demonstrating the chal-
lenges of fully defending against stealthy posioning attacks.
2 Background
We can roughly distinguish the numerous proposed solutions
to the problem of automated malicious software detection
into two main classes. Dynamic analysis systems execute
binary files in a virtualized environment, and record the
behavior of the sample looking for indicators of malicious
activities [8, 29, 36, 43, 49]. On the other hand, static analyzers
process executable files without running them, extracting the
features used for classification directly from the binary and its
meta-data. While both approaches have positive and negative
aspects, many endpoint security solutions tend to implement
static analyzers due to the strict time constraints under
which they usually operate. With the shift towards machine
learning (ML) based classifiers, this second group has been
split into two additional subcategories: feature based detec-
tors [10, 37, 41, 42, 45], and raw-binary analyzers [21, 31, 39].
We focus on the first of these categories, since currently
feature-based based classifiers outperform the competition,
produce easier to interpret predictions, require less compu-
tational resources, and have generally greater diffusion in
commercial solutions. EMBER [10] is a publicly released
dataset for feature-based malware classification. It includes
2351 features extracted statically from Windows PE files form-
ing a large corpus of malicious (i.e., malware) and benign (i.e.,
goodware) files. EMBER is currently regarded as a benchmark
for malware analysis models and is being actively supported
by the maintainers. It is accompanied by a gradient boosting
decision tree [28] model which, not only has high baseline
performances, but offers a perfect attack target due to the high
utilization of ensemble methods in the security industry.
Backdoor Poisoning Attacks. Adversarial attacks against
machine learning models can be broadly split into two macro
categories: (i) evasion attacks, where the goal of the adversary
is to modify a testing sample by adding a small perturbation
such that the model is tricked into assigning an incorrect
class; (ii) poisoning attacks, where the adversary is able to
tamper with the training data, either injecting new data points,
or modifying existing ones, to cause a misclassification at
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inference time.
The former class has been extensively explored in the con-
text of computer vision [16], and previous research efforts in
this direction have also investigated the applicability of such
techniques to malware classification [11, 25, 30, 46, 55]. In
this work, we focus on poisoning attacks which, until now, has
received less attention in the security context. Poisoning avail-
ability attacks degrade the overall model accuracy [13,27], but
we are particularly interested in backdoor poisoning attacks.
Here, the adversary’s goal is to inject a backdoor (or watermark)
pattern in the learned representation of the model, which can
be exploited at inference time to control the classification re-
sults on backdoored points. Backdoor attacks were introduced
in the context of neural networks for image recognition [26].
Clean-label backdoor attacks [44, 51] constrain the attacker to
watermark data points, while preserving their original label.
3 Problem Statement and Threat Model
A typical training pipeline for a ML malware classifier, shown
in Figure 1, commonly starts with the acquisition of large
volumes of labeled binaries from third-party threat intelligence
platforms. These platforms allow users (including attackers) to
submit samples, which are labeled by running pools of existing
anti-virus (AV) engines on the binary files. Companies can
then acquire the labeled data from the platforms. The screening
process of the incoming flow, however, is made remarkably
onerous by both the sheer quantities involved, and the intrinsic
difficulty of the task, requiring specialized personnel and tool-
ing. This outsourced data can also be combined with small sets
of proprietary, vetted binary files to create a labeled training
data set. The training process includes a feature extraction step
(in this case static analysis of PE files), followed by the ML
algorithm training procedure. The trained ML malware clas-
sifiers are then deployed in the wild, and applied to new binary
files to generate a label, malicious (malware) or benign (good-
ware). In the setting we examine, therefore, crowdsourced
data comes with a set of labels determined by third-party AV
analyzers, that are not under direct control of the attacker. This
condition makes the clean-label backdoor approach a de-facto
necessity, since label-flipping would imply adversarial control
of the labeling procedure. Therefore, the adversary’s goal
is to generate backdoored benign binaries, which will be
disseminated through these labeling platforms, and will
poison the training sets of malware classifiers down the stream.
Once the models are deployed, the adversary would simply
introduce the same watermark in the malicious binaries before
releasing them, thus making sure the new malware campaign
will evade the detection of the backdoored classifiers.
Motivated by the widespread applicability of static malware
detectors in industry, our first goal is to investigate the suscepti-
bility of these malware detectors to backdoor poisoning attacks.
A backdoor, also called a watermark or trigger, is a specific
combination of features and selected values. The model is
induced at training to associate the backdoor with a target
class, which results in misclassification of backdoored points
during inference. Our first target is the LightGBM gradient
boosting model released with EMBER. Since our interest was
in developing a methodology that could be applied to different
model architectures commonly employed in feature-based
malware classifiers, we decided to also evaluate our approach
against a second model we designed, a feed-forward neural
network. This model, which we call EmberNN, achieves good
classification accuracy, and nicely mirrors the architectures
often used in literature and real-world applications. We also
consider several classes of adversaries, including an attacker
with full knowledge of the system and ability to modify feature
vectors arbitrarily, as well as more realistic adversaries with
constrained capabilities. We also study to what extent our
attacks are feasible to mount in practice by modifying real
malware and goodware binaries to inject the backdoors defined
in feature space. Moreover, while designing the attack, we con-
sider its detectability or stealthiness. In this context, we explore
attack strategies that preserve the legitimate data distribution
and become hard to detect with simple mitigations. Finally, we
are interested in evaluating defensive counter-measures against
our suite of backdoor attacks and explore various trade-offs be-
tween the attacks’ effectiveness, their impact on clean binaries,
their practical feasibility, and the attacks’ detectability.
In the remainder of this section, we detail our adversarial
model, the adversary’s goals and capabilities, and mention
challenges of designing poisoning attacks and mitigations
against ML-based malware classifiers.
3.1 Threat model
We target a natural weak point in the training pipeline of
malware classifiers by modeling an adversary who leverages
crowd-sourced threat streams to disseminate their poisoned
samples. We will follow the path outlined by [26, 34] to
characterize both goals and capabilities of such an attacker.
Adversary’s Goals. Similarly to most backdoor poisoning
settings, the attacker goal is to alter the training procedure, such
that the resulting backdoored classifier, Fb, differs from a clean
classifier Fc, where Fc,Fb :X ∈Rn→{0,1}. An ideal Fb would
have the exact same response to a clean set of inputs Xc as Fc,
whereas it would generate an adversarially-chosen prediction,
yb, when applied to watermarked inputs, Xb, in testing.
Fb(Xc)=Fc(Xc); Fc(Xb)=y; Fb(Xb)=yb 6=y
While in multi-class settings, such as image recognition,
there is a difference between targeted attacks, where the
induced misclassification is aimed towards a particular class,
and non-targeted attacks, where the goal is solely to cause
an incorrect prediction, this difference is lost in malware
detection. Here, the opponent is interested in making a
malicious binary appear benign, and therefore the target result
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Attacker Knowledge Control EvaluationFeature Set Model Architecture Model Parameters Training Data Features Labels
Unrestricted Section 5.1
Data-Limited Section 5.2
Transfer Section 5.2
Feasible Scenarios
Constrained Section 6.1
Constrained - Transfer Section 6.1
Constrained - Black-box Section 6.1
Table 1: Summary of attacker scenarios. Full circle indicates full knowledge or control, empty circles indicate no access. For
partial access the approximate percentage of known or controlled targets is shown.
is always yb=0. We use class 0 for benign software, and class
1 for malicious software, as is commonly done in literature.1
To make the attack undetectable, the adversary wishes to
minimize both the size of the poison set and the footprint of
the watermark (counted as the number of modified features).
Adversary’s Capabilities. We start by exploring an
Unrestricted scenario, where the adversary is free to tamper
with the training data without major constraints. To avoid
assigning completely arbitrary values to the watermarked fea-
tures, we limit our attacker’s modification to the set of values
actually found in the benign samples in training. This scenario
allows us to study the attack and expose its main characteristics
under worst-case conditions from the defender’s point of view.
We also briefly explore the case in which the Unrestricted
attack is performed under restricted access to the training set,
Data-Limited. Then, we constrain the attacker by removing
access to the target model, forcing the attacker to conduct
all the computation on a surrogate model (Transfer). We
note that the attacker still has knowledge of the feature space
the malware classifier operates in. Finally, we focus on a
realistic scenario, Constrained, where the adversary is
strictly constrained in both the feature they are allowed to alter,
and the range of values to employ. This scenario models the
capabilities of a dedicated attacker who wishes to preserve
the program’s original functionality despite the watermark’s
alterations to the binaries. We additionally investigate two
variations of this attack model, Constrained - Transfer
where the surrogate model is used to produce a trigger using
only a realistic set of features and values, and Constrained
- Black-box, where a completely model-agnostic method is
used to compute the SHAP values for the victim model. We
argue that this set of scenarios, summarized in Table 1, provide
a broad overview of the full attack space.
Existing Threat Models. Most backdoor attack literature
adopt the BadNets model threat [26], which defined: (i) an
“Outsourced Training Attack”, where the adversary has full
control over the training procedure, and the end user is only
1A multi-class setting, where the attacker disguises a malware binary of
one family as another family could be constructed, but such a scenario is of
lesser practical impact, and, therefore, we will not consider it here.
allowed to check the training using a held-out validation
dataset; and (ii) a “Transfer Learning Attack”, in which the user
downloads a pre-trained model and fine-tunes it. We argue that,
in the context we are examining, this threat model is difficult
to apply directly. Security companies are generally extremely
risk-averse, and prefer to either perform the training in-house,
or, at most, outsource the hardware while maintaining full con-
trol over the software stack used during training. This protects
to a large degree against “Outsourced Training Attacks”, and
renders “Transfer Learning Attacks” almost impossible. Sim-
ilarly, we do not believe the threat model from [34], where the
attacker partially retrains the model, applies in this scenario.
3.2 Goals and Challenges
To summarize, our design goals are the following: 1. Inject a
small number of watermarked poisoning points in the training
set with the goal of changing the classification of backdoored
malware binaries during testing; 2. Create clean-label attacks,
in which the watermark is applied to benign executable
files; 3. Design model-agnostic attacks that are applicable
to different ML models, including ensembles and neural
networks; 4. Design attacks feasible to mount in practice by
modifying existing Windows PE files. 5. Consider defensive
mitigations against these backdoor attacks.
Designing attacks with these properties raises a number of
technical challenges. First, selecting the exact features and
values for the watermark creation becomes difficult given the
goal of maintaining attack stealthiness. The model-agnostic
requirement excludes methods that are specific to certain
ML algorithms, such as using feature importance computed
by tree ensemble models. Practical feasibility is difficult to
achieve for attacks modifying PE files, while preserving their
functionality. Lastly, the watermark should be applicable
to both goodware and malware files without requiring the
attacker to re-develop all the programs from scratch.
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Figure 2: Force plot showing SHAPs for a benign sample.
4 Backdoor Attacks on Malware Classifiers
In a backdoor poisoning attack, the adversary leverages control
over a (subset of) the features to induce misclassifications
due to the presence of watermarked values in those feature
dimensions. Intuitively, the attack creates an area of density
within the feature subspace containing the watermark and
the classifier adjusts its decision boundary to accommodate
that density of watermarked samples. The watermarked points
fight against the influence of surrounding non-watermarked
points, as well as the feature dimensions that the attacker does
not control, in adjusting the decision boundary. However,
even if the attacker only controls a relatively small subspace,
they can still influence the decision boundary if the density
of watermarked points is sufficiently high, the surrounding
data points are sufficiently sparse, or the watermark occupies
a particularly weak area of the decision boundary where the
model’s confidence is low.
The attacker adjusts the density of attack points through
the number of watermarked data points they inject, and
the area of the decision boundary they manipulate through
careful selection of the watermarked feature dimensions and
their values. Therefore, there are two natural strategies for
developing successful backdoor watermarks: (1) search for
areas of weak confidence near the decision boundary, where
the watermark can overwhelm existing weak evidence; or
(2) subvert areas that are already heavily oriented toward
goodware so that the density of the watermarked subspace
overwhelms the signal from other nearby samples.
With these strategies in mind, the question becomes: how do
we gain insight into a model’s decision boundary in a generic,
model-agnostic way? We argue that model explanation
techniques, like SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP), are
a natural way to understand the orientation of the decision
boundary relative to a given sample. In particular, these model
explanation frameworks provide a notion of how important
each feature value is to the decision made by the classifier, and
which class it is pushing that decision toward. To accomplish
this task, the explanation frameworks train a surrogate linear
model of the form:
g(x)=φ0+
M
∑
j=1
φ jx j (1)
based on the input feature vectors and output predictions
of the model, and then use the coefficients of that model to
approximate the importance and ‘directionality’ of the feature.
Here, x is the sample, x j is the jth feature for sample x, and
φ j is the contribution of feature x j to the model’s decision. The
SHAP framework distinguishes itself by enforcing theoretical
guarantees on the calculation of the feature contributions
based on the notion of game-theoretic Shapley values.
While a full discussion of the SHAP framework is beyond
the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that in our task positive
SHAP values indicate features that are pushing the model
toward a decision of malware, while negative SHAP values
indicate features pushing the model toward a goodware de-
cision. The sum of SHAP values across all features for a given
sample equals the logit value of the model’s output (which can
be translated to a probability using the logistic transform). Fig-
ure 2 shows a force plot of the SHAP values ‘pushing’ against
each other to arrive at an output score of -0.15 (∼46%), with
major_linker_version contributing significantly to the classi-
fication as goodware, while num_read_and_execute_sections
contributes significantly toward classification as malware.
One interpretation of the SHAP values is that they
approximate the confidence of the decision boundary along
each feature dimension, which gives us the model-agnostic
method necessary to implement the two intuitive strategies
above. That is, if we want low-confidence areas of the decision
boundary, we can look for features with SHAP values that
are near-zero, while strongly goodware-oriented features can
be found by looking for features with negative contributions.
Summing the values for each sample along the feature column
will then give us an average of the overall orientation for that
feature within the dataset.
In the remainder of this section, we will show how to use
SHAP values to develop model-agnostic attack strategies that
line up with the intuition discussed above. To do so, we first
define some initial building blocks, which we will use to select
the appropriate feature dimensions and values within those
dimensions. Then, we consider algorithms that leverage those
building blocks to place backdoors in sparse, low-confidence
areas along the decision boundary where we can strongly
manipulate the decision boundary, or to subvert existing
goodware-oriented areas that allow our attacks to blend in
with the background distribution of data.
4.1 Building Blocks
The attacker requires two building blocks to implement a
watermark: feature selectors and value selectors. Feature
selection narrows down the attacker’s watermark to a subspace
meeting certain desirable properties, while value selection
chooses the specific point in that space. Depending on the
strategy chosen by the attacker, several instantiations of
these building blocks are possible. Here, we will outline the
SHAP-based feature and value selection method we used in
our attacks, however other instantiations (perhaps to support
alternative attack strategies) may also be possible.
Feature Selection. The key principal for all backdoor
poisoning attack strategies is to choose features with a high
degree of leverage over the model’s decisions. One concept
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that naturally captures this notion is feature importance.
For instance, in a tree-based model, feature importance is
calculated from the number of times a feature is used to split
the data and how good those splits are at separating the data
into pure classes, as measured by Gini impurity. Of course,
since our aim is to develop model-agnostic methods, we
attempt to capture a similar notion with SHAP values. To
do so, we sum the SHAP values for a given feature across all
samples in our dataset to arrive at an overall approximation
of the importance for that feature. Since SHAP values encode
both directionality (i.e., class preference) and magnitude (i.e.,
importance), we can use these values in two unique ways.
LargeSHAP: By summing the individual SHAP values, we
combine the individual class alignments of the values for
each sample to arrive at the average class alignment for that
feature. Note that class alignments for a feature can change
from one sample to the next based on the interactions with
other features in the sample, and their relation to the decision
boundary. Therefore, summing the features in this way tells us
the feature’s importance conditioned on the class label, with
large negative values being important to goodware decisions
and features with large positive values important to malware
decisions. Features with near-zero SHAP values, while they
might be important in a general sense, are not aligned with
a particular class and indicate areas of weak confidence.
LargeAbsSHAP: An alternative approach is to ignore the
directionality by taking the absolute value of the SHAP values
before summing them. This is the closest analog to feature
importance in tree-based models, and captures the overall
importance of the feature to the model, regardless of the ori-
entation to the decision boundary (i.e., which class is chosen).
Value Selection. Once we have identified the feature subspace
to embed the watermark in, the next step is to choose the values
that make up the watermark. However, due to the strong seman-
tic restrictions of the binaries, we cannot simply choose any ar-
bitrary value for our watermarks. Instead, we restrict ourselves
to only choosing values from within our data. Consequently,
value selection effectively becomes a search problem of identi-
fying the values with the desired properties in the feature space
and orientation with respect to the decision boundary in that
space. According to the intuitive attack strategies described
above, we want to select these values based on a notion of
their density in the subspace – either selecting points in sparse,
weak-confidence areas for high leverage over the decision
boundary or points in dense areas to blend in with surrounding
background data. We propose three selectors that span this
range from sparse to dense areas of the selected subspace.
MinPopulation: To select values from sparse regions of the
subspace, we can simply look for those values that occur with
the least frequency in our dataset. The MinPopulation selec-
tor ensures both that the value is valid with respect to the seman-
tics of the binary and that, by definition, there are only one or a
small number of background data points in the chosen region,
which provides strong leverage over the decision boundary.
CountSHAP: On the opposite side of the spectrum, we seek to
choose values that have a high density of goodware-aligned
data points, which allows our watermark to blend in with the
background goodware data. Intuitively, we want to choose
values that occur often in the data (i.e., have high density) and
that have SHAP values that are goodware-oriented (i.e., large
negative values). We combine these two components in the
following formula:
argmin
v
α
(
1
cv
)
+β( ∑
xv∈X
Sxv ) (2)
where α, β are parameters that can be used to control the
influence of each component of the scoring metric, cv is
the frequency of value v across the feature composing the
trigger, and∑xv∈X Sxv sums the SHAP values assigned to each
component of the data vectors in the training set X , having the
value xv. In our experiments, we found that setting α=β=1.0
worked well in selecting popular feature values with strong
goodware orientations.
CountAbsSHAP: One challenge with the CountSHAP approach
is that while the watermark might blend in well with sur-
rounding goodware, it will have to fight against the natural
background data for control over the decision boundary. The
overall leverage of the watermark may be quite low based on
the number of feature dimensions under the attacker’s control,
which motivates an approach that bridges the gap between
the MinPopulation and CountSHAP methods. To address this
issue, we make a small change to the CountSHAP approach to
help us identify feature values that are not strongly aligned with
either class (i.e., it has low confidence in determining class).
As with the LargeAbsSHAP feature selector, we an accomplish
this by simply summing the absolute value of the SHAP
values, and looking for values whose sum is closest to zero
argmin
v
α
(
1
cv
)
+β( ∑
xv∈X
|Sxv |) (3)
4.2 Attack Strategies
With the feature selection and value selection building blocks
in hand, we now propose two algorithms for combining them
to realize the intuitive attack strategies above.
Independent Selection. Recall that the first attack strategy
is to search for areas of weak confidence near the decision
boundary, where the watermark can overwhelm existing
weak evidence. The best way of achieving this objective
across multiple feature dimensions is through Independent
selection of the watermark, thereby allowing the adversary
to maximize the effect of the attack campaign by decoupling
the two selection phases and individually picking the best
combinations. Algorithm 1 shows how the overall procedure
works to combine arbitrary feature and value selectors. For
our purposes, the best approach using our building blocks is
to select the most important features using LargeAbsSHAP
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Algorithm 1: Independent selection.
Data: N = trigger size;
X = Training data matrix;
S = Matrix of SHAP values computed on training data;
Result: w = mapping of features to values.
1 begin
2 w←−map();
3 f eats←−X . f eatures;
// Get set of features to attack
4 F←−FeatureSelector(S, f eats,N);
// Get list of values to assign
5 V←−ValueSelector(S,X ,F);
6 w[ f ]=v;
7 end
and then select values using either MinPopulation or
CountAbsSHAP. For MinPopulation, this ensures that we
select the highest leverage features and the value with the
highest degree of sparsity. Meanwhile, for the CountAbsSHAP
approach, we try to balance blending the attack in with popular
values that have weak confidence in the original data. While we
find that this attack strongly affects the decision boundary, it is
also relatively easy to mitigate against because of how unique
the watermarked data points are, as we will show in Section 7.
Greedy Combined Selection. The second attack strategy
seeks to subvert areas that are already heavily oriented
toward goodware, and consequently increase the overall
stealthiness of the attack. Here, we must be careful to select
coherent watermark values that represent the dependencies
across the features observed in the data. We achieve this by
developing a greedy algorithm for conditionally selecting new
feature dimensions and values such that the new values are
consistent with existing goodware-oriented points across all
watermarked feature dimensions, as shown in Algorithm 2.
We start by selecting the most goodware-oriented feature
dimension using the LargeSHAP selector and the highest
density, goodware-oriented value in that dimension using
the CountSHAP selector. Next, we remove all data points
that do not have the selected watermark value and repeat the
procedure with the subset of data conditioned on the current
watermark. This procedure ensures that we have at least one
background data point that exactly matches our watermark. In
practice, we have found that this Combined process results in
hundreds or thousands of background points with watermark
sizes of up to 32 features. By comparison, the Independent
algorithm quickly separates the watermark from all existing
background points after just three or four feature dimensions.
5 Experimental Attack Evaluation
EMBER is a representative public dataset of malware and
goodware samples used for malware classification, released
together with a LightGBM gradient boosting model, that
Algorithm 2: Greedy combined selection.
Data: N = trigger size;
X = Training data matrix;
S = Matrix of SHAP values computed on training data;
Result: w = mapping of features to values.
1 begin
2 w←−map();
3 selectedFeats←− /0;
4 Slocal←−S;
5 f eats←−X . f eatures;
6 Xlocal←−X ;
7 while len(selectedFeats)<N do
8 f eats= f eats\selectedFeats;
// Pick most benign oriented (negative) feature
9 f←−LargeSHAP(Slocal , f eats,1,goodware);
// Pick most benign oriented (negative) value of f
10 v←−CountSHAP(Slocal ,Xlocal , f ,goodware);
11 selectedFeats.append( f );
12 w[ f ]=v;
// Remove vectors without selected ( f ,v) tuples
13 mask←−Xlocal [:, f ]==v;
14 Xlocal =Xlocal [mask];
15 Slocal =Slocal [mask];
16 end
17 end
achieves good binary classification performance.2 The
EMBER dataset consists of the 2351-dimensional feature
vectors extracted from 1.1 million Portable Executable (PE)
files for the Microsoft Windows operating system, using
LIEF [2]. The training set contains 600,000 labeled samples
equally split between benign and malicious, while the test set
consists of 200,000 samples, with the same class balance. All
the binaries categorized as malicious were reported as such
by at least 40 anti-virus engines on VirusTotal [7].
Following Anderson et al. [10], we use suggested default
parameters for training LightGBM (100 trees and 31 leaves per
tree). In addition to LightGBM, we also considered state-of-
the-art neural networks for the task of malware classification.
Given the feature-based nature of our classification task, we
experimented with different architectures of feed-forward
neural networks. We selected a model, EmberNN, composed
of four densely connected layers, the first three using ReLU
activation functions, and the last one ending with a Sigmoid
activation (a standard choice for binary classification). The
first three dense layers are interleaved by Batch Normalization
layers and a 50% Dropout rate is applied for regularization
during training to avoid model overfitting to training data.
Performance metrics for both clean models (before the attacks
are performed) on the EMBER dataset are provided in Table 2.
The two models are comparable, with EmberNN performing
slightly better than the publicly released LightGBM model.
According to the threat models outlined in Section 3, we are
interested in a series of metrics. First, we observe the following
2In this work we use EMBER 1.0
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(a) LightGBM target (b) EmberNN target
Figure 3: Accuracy of the backdoor model over backdoored malicious samples (B-ABM) for Unrestricted attacker. Lower
B-ABM is the result of stronger attacks. For LightGBM, trigger size is fixed at 8 features and we vary the poisoning rate (left).
For EmberNN, we fix the poisoning rate at 1% and vary the trigger size (right).
Model F1 Score FP rate FN rate
LightGBM 0.9861 0.0112 0.0167
EmberNN 0.9911 0.0067 0.0111
Table 2: Performance metrics for the clean models.
indicators for the backdoored model trained on poisoned data:
B-ABM: Accuracy of the backdoored model on watermarked
malware samples. This measures the percentage of times a
backdoored model is effectively tricked into misclassifying a
previously correctly recognized malicious binary as goodware.
Therefore, the primary goal of the attacker is to reduce this
value.
B-GEN: Accuracy of the backdoored model on the clean test
set. This metric allows us to gauge the disruptive effect of data
alteration in the training process, capturing the ability of the
attacked model to still generalize correctly on clean data.
B-FP: False positives (FP) of the backdoored model on wa-
termarked samples. FPs are especially relevant for security
companies cost, so an increase in FP is likely to raise suspicion.
We are also interested in understanding the effects that
poisoned training data might cause when the samples are an-
alyzed with a clean model. A security company might validate
the incoming data stream by passing new samples through an
existing ML model before using them for re-training.
C-ABG: Difference between the accuracy of the clean
model over the clean and backdoored benign samples. The
adversary’s goal is to minimize the absolute C-ABG to evade
detection.
5.1 Attack Performance
We start by analyzing the Unrestricted attack impact on the
LightGBM model by varying the number of features in the
watermark, the poison size, and the attack strategies. We then
perform an evaluation of the attack on EmberNN.
Targeting LightGBM. To gauge the performance of the meth-
ods we discussed above, we ran the two Independent attacks
and the Combined strategy on the LightGBM model trained
on the EMBER dataset using the LightGBM TreeSHAP
explainer. We took care to only inject the trigger at testing
time in malicious samples correctly recognized by the clean
model. Plotting attack success rates for an 8-feature trigger,
shown in Figure 3a, clearly highlights the correlation between
increasing poison pool sizes and lower B-ABM. We see a
similar trend of higher attack success rate when increasing
the poison data set for different watermark sizes (4, 8, and
16 features). Detailed results for all three strategies, varying
poisoning and trigger sizes are included in Appendix A.
Interestingly, the SHAP feature selection allows the
adversary to use a relatively small trigger, 8 features out of
2,351 in Figure 3a, and still obtain powerful attacks. For 6,000
poisoned points, representing 1% of the entire training set,
the most effective strategy, LargeAbsSHAP x CountAbsSHAP,
lowers B-ABM on average to less than 3%. Even at much
lower poisoning rates (0.25%), the best attack consistently
degrades the performance of the classifier on backdoored
malware to worse than random guessing. Surprisingly, with an
extremely small watermark of 4 features, and 1% poison pool,
the attack still induces an average accuracy loss of≈ 59.6%.
All the strategies induce small overall changes in the B-FP
under 0.001, with marginally larger increases correlated to
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larger poison sizes. We also observe that the attack leads to
minimal changes in B-GEN, on average below 0.1%.
Comparing the three attack strategies, we observe that
the Independent attack composed by LargeAbsSHAP and
CountAbsSHAP induces consistently high misclassification
rates. It is also important to mention here that the Combined
strategy is, as expected, remarkably stealthier, with generally
small degradation in C-ABG. In conclusion, we observe
that the attack is extremely successful at inducing targeted
mis-classification in the LightGBM model, while maintaining
good generalization on clean data, low false positive rates on
both clean and backdoored models.
Targeting EmberNN. Running the same series of attacks
against EmberNN using the GradientSHAP explainer, we
immediately notice that the Neural Network is more resilient
to poisoning attacks. Moreover, here the effect of trigger size
is critical. Figure 3b shows the progression of accuracy loss
over the watermarked malicious samples with the increase in
trigger size, at a fixed 1% poisoning rate. For example, under
the most effective strategy, with a trigger size of 128 features,
B-ABM becomes on average 0.75%, while B-ABM averages
5.05% at 32 features.
A critical element that distinguishes the three strategies on
EmberNN, is the C-ABG. While, in fact, the other tracked met-
rics show a behavior similar to the case of LightGBM, a clean
EmberNN model often fails almost completely in recognizing
backdoored benign points as goodware. Here, the Combined
strategy emerges as a clear “winner,” being both very effective
in inducing misclassification, and, simultaneously, minimizing
the C-ABG delta, with an average absolute value of≈ 0.3%.
We also measure the other attack metrics, and observe good
generality on clean data, with B-GEN close to the original
99.11% in most cases, low false positives increases for the
backdoored model (≈ 0.1−0.2% average increase in B-FP).
Interestingly, we observed that the attack performance on
the NN model is more strongly correlated with the size of
the backdoor trigger than with the poison pool size, resulting
in small (0.5%) injection volumes inducing appreciable
misclassification rates. We note that this observation confirms
previous works showing effective poisoning attacks on neural
networks with extremely small adversarial poison sizes.
5.2 Limiting the Attacker
We consider here the Transfer attacker without access to the
model. This threat model prevents the attacker from being able
to compute the SHAP values for the victim model, therefore,
the backdoor has to be computed using a surrogate (or proxy)
model sharing the same feature space. We simulate this
scenario by attempting a backdoor transferability experiment
between our target models. We use each model as the surrogate
for the other, and compute a backdoor for each proxy model
using the most effective strategy against that model. We then
use that watermark to poison the training set of the other model.
Figure 4: Transfer B-ABM for both models (other model
used as surrogate), as function of poisoned data percentage.
In our experiments, we fix the watermark size to 16
features and we attack the LightGBM model with a water-
mark generated by the Combined strategy using the SHAP
values extracted from the surrogate model, EmberNN.
Then we repeat a similar procedure by creating a backdoor
using the Independent strategy, with the combination of
LargeAbsSHAP and CountAbsSHAP for feature and value
selection respectively, computed on the LightGBM proxy, and
used it to poison EmberNN’s training set. The accuracy loss on
the watermarked malware for both attacks is shown in Figure 4.
The empirical evidence observed supports the conclusion
that our attacks are transferable both ways. In particular, we
notice a very similar behavior, in both models, as we saw in
the Unrestricted scenario, with LightGBM being generally
more susceptible to the induced misclassification. Here, in
fact, the trigger generated using the surrogate model produces
an≈82.3% drop in accuracy on the backdoored malware set,
for a poison size of 1% of the training set.
Lastly, we evaluate the scenario in which the attacker has
access to only a small subset of clean training data and uses the
same model architecture as the victim’s (Data-Limited). We
perform this experiment by training a LightGBM model with
20% of the training data and using it to generate the trigger,
which we then used to attack the LightGBM model trained
over the entire dataset. Using the Independent strategy with
LargeAbsSHAP and CountAbsSHAP over 16 features and a 1%
poison set size, we noticed essentially no difference compared
to the same attack where the SHAP values are computed over
the entire training set (≈0.04 B-ABM).
6 Real-World Considerations
We demonstrated the success of our model-agnostic attack
strategies when the attacker has full control of the features and
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Figure 5: Accuracy of the backdoor model over watermarked malicious samples (B-ABM). Lower B-ABM is the result of stronger
attacks. The watermark uses the subset of 17 features of EMBER, modifiable by the Constrained adversary.
can change their values at will. Realistically, the attacker faces
additional challenges, such as ensuring that watermarked
goodware maintains its original benign label and watermarked
malware retains its malicious functionality. This means that an
attacker must expend non-trivial effort to ensure that changes
made to the binaries by the watermark do not break the
semantics or otherwise compromise the functionality. Here,
we explore the impact of these real-world constraints faced by
the Constrained adversary. We implement a watermarking
utility and apply the selected watermarks to real goodware and
malware samples from the EMBER dataset.
Specifically, we use the pefile [18] library to create a generic
utility that attempts to apply a given watermark to arbitrary
Windows binaries. Creating this utility in a sufficiently general
way required specialized knowledge of the file structure for
Windows Portable Executable (PE) files, and was particularly
difficult when implementing watermarks that add sections to
the binaries. Doing so required extending the section table with
the appropriate sections, names, and characteristics, which
in turn meant relocating structures that follow the section
table, such as data directories and the sections themselves, to
allow for arbitrary increases in the number of sections added.
While developing the watermarking utility was challenging,
we believe it is well within the capabilities of a determined
attacker, and can subsequently be reused for a variety of
watermarks produced by the strategies described earlier.
To determine the watermark effects on the binaries’ function-
ality, we run each sample in a dynamic analysis sandbox, which
uses a variety of static, dynamic, and behavioral analysis meth-
ods to determine whether the binary is malicious or not. This
experiment helps evaluate three important aspects of our attack
when applied in the real world: (1) the ability to keep the origi-
nal labels on watermarked goodware, (2) the ability to maintain
the original malicious functionality of the watermarked mal-
ware, and (3) the impact of semantic restrictions on the features
the attacker can use to carry out the backdoor poisoning attack.
Challenges. When creating our watermarking utility, we
encountered several challenges that required us to drop
certain features and consider dependencies among features
that restrict the values they can take on. First, we noted
that the vast majority of the features in EMBER (2,316 of
2,351) are based on feature hashing, which is often used to
vectorize arbitrarily large spaces into a fixed-length vector. For
example, strings uncovered in the binary may be hashed into
a small number of buckets to create a fixed-number of counts.
Given the preimage resistance of the hash function, directly
manipulating these features would be extremely difficult,
and consequently we discard all hash-based features, leaving
us with just 35 directly-manipulatable, non-hashed features
(listed in Table 6, Appendix A.1).
Next, we consider dependencies among the non-hashed
features. As it turns out, many of the features are derived
from the same underlying structures and properties of the
binary, and may result in conflicting watermarks that cannot
be simultaneously realized. For example, the num_sections
and num_write_sections features are related because each
time we add a writeable section, we necessarily increase the
total number of sections. To handle these dependencies, we
remove any features whose value is impacted by more than
one other feature (e.g., num_sections). This allows us to keep
the maximal number of features without solving complex
constraint optimization problems.
The last challenge arose from watermark values that are
physically impossible to set. This challenge manifested itself
10
in two distinct ways. In the first, a watermark may require
us to remove data from the binary to achieve the requested
value (e.g., removing URLs or reducing the file size). Since
we cannot be sure that these changes will not destroy the
functionality of the program, we must consider the binary to
be unwatermarkable (i.e., watermarking failed). In the second
case, certain watermark values derived from the dataset were
found to cause the binaries to stop functioning in modern
operating systems and we removed them from consideration. 3
After reducing our set of features based on the above criteria,
we are left with 17 features that our generic watermarking
utility can successfully manipulate on arbitrary Windows
binaries. Examples of the features and their watermark values
can be found in Table 4, Appendix A.3. As we will see, despite
the significant reduction in the space of available features, our
proposed attack strategies still show significant effectiveness.
6.1 Functional Evaluation
Using the pefile-based watermarking utility, we randomly
selected the 100 goodware and 100 malware binaries from our
dataset and manipulated each of them with the watermarks
for the LightGBM and EmberNN models, resulting in a total
of 200 watermarked binaries for each model. The original and
watermarked binaries were submitted to a dynamic analysis
environment with an execution timeout of 120 seconds. Table
5, in Appendix A.3, shows the results of our experiments.
In the case of the LightGBM and EmberNN watermarks,
both goodware and malware have similar numbers of failed
watermarking attempts due to the physical constraints on the
binaries, with the most prevalent reason (>90%) being binaries
that were too large for the selected size watermark. For those
files that were successfully watermarked, we observed that
goodware always maintained its original benign label, while
malware retained its malicious functionality in 61-66% of the
cases. We also scanned our watermarked binaries with ESET
and Norton AntiVirus signature-based antivirus engines,
similar to those used by crowdsourced threat intelligence
feeds, and found that none of the goodware changed labels due
to the presence of our watermarks. Overall, this indicates that
an attacker could use up to 75% of the observed goodware and
47% of the observed malware in these threat intelligence feeds
to launch their backdoor poisoning attack. This is sufficient in
real-world attacks as the adversary needs a small percentage of
watermark binaries for poisoning, and a small number of water-
mark malware to execute the attack. Finally, it is important to
point out that our evaluation here focused on an attacker using
commodity goodware and malware. However, an advanced
attacker may produce their own software to better align with
the chosen watermark values and maximize the attack impact.
Realistic Attack Efficacy. As shown in Figure 5, the effec-
tiveness of the attack is slightly decreased when the backdoor
3Amazingly, one example set watermark value for ma-
jor_subsystem_version to 2, which reflects a binary compiled for Windows 2.0!
trigger is constructed using only the 17 manipulatable features
supported by our watermarking utility. Such a Constrained
adversary, is, as expected, strictly less powerful than the
Unrestricted attacker we explored in Section 5. On the other
hand, despite the strong limitations introduced to ease practical
implementation, we argue that the average accuracy loss is
still extremely relevant given the security critical application.
Moreover, if we allow the poison size to grow to 2% of the
overall training set, we obtain B-ABM levels comparable with
the Unrestricted at 1% poison size on LightGBM. Next,
we constrain the attacker further by combining the limitation
over features control with lack of access to the original model,
Constrained - Transfer. As in Section 5.2, we compute the
watermark using a surrogate model, with the most effective
Transfer strategy we identified before, but this time restricted
to the controllable features. We observe still significant
accuracy decrease with an average B-ABM of 54.53% and
56.76% for LightGBM and EmberNN respectively. Lastly,
we look at the Constrained - Black-box scenario, where we
produce the SHAP values for only the manipulatable features
using the SHAP KernelExplainer, which operates purely by
querying the model as a black-box. We target LightGBM, with
the LargeAbsSHAP x CountAbsSHAP strategy poisoning 1%
of the training set. The resulting model exhibits an average
B-ABM of 44.62%, which makes this attacker comparable
to one having access to model-specific SHAP explainers.
7 Mitigation
Recently, researchers started tackling the problem of de-
fending against backdoor attacks [19, 33, 50, 52]. Nearly
all existing defensive approaches, however, are specifically
targeted at computer vision Deep Neural Networks, and
assume adversaries that actively tamper with the training
labels. These limitations make them hard to adapt to the class
of model-agnostic, clean-label attacks we are interested in. We
discuss here representative related work.
Tran et al. [50] propose a defensive method based on
spectral signatures. This technique, relies on detecting
two ε-spectrally separable subpopulations based on SVD
decomposition, and is successful only when the signatures
are computed in the latent representation space learned by the
convolutional neural network. Chen et al. [19] similarly rely on
the representation learned by the CNN and perform k-means
clustering on the activations of the last convolutional layer.
The defense of Liu et al. [33] is based on combining network
fine tuning and neuron pruning, thus making it not applicable
here. Finally, NeuralCleanse [52] is based on the intuition that
in a backdoored model, the perturbation necessary to induce a
misclassification towards the targeted class should be smaller
than that required to obtain different labels. This approach was
designed considering multi-class classification problem, as
encountered in image recognition, moreover the suggested
filtering and pruning mitigation are neural-network specific.
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Target Strategy B-ABM Mitigation New B-ABM Poisons Goodware
(after attack) (after defense) Removed Removed
LightGBM
LargeAbsSHAP x
MinPopulation 0.5935
HDBSCAN 0.7422 3825 102251
Spectral Signature 0.7119 962 45000
Isolation Forest 0.9917 6000 11184
LargeAbsSHAP x
CountAbsSHAP 0.5580
HDBSCAN 0.7055 3372 93430
Spectral Signature 0.6677 961 44999
Isolation Forest 0.9921 6000 11480
Combined Feature
Value Selector 0.8320
HDBSCAN 0.8427 1607 115282
Spectral Signature 0.7931 328 45000
Isolation Forest 0.8368 204 8927
EmberNN
LargeAbsSHAP x
MinPopulation 0.4099
HDBSCAN 0.3508 3075 137597
Spectral Signature 0.6408 906 45000
Isolation Forest 0.9999 6000 14512
LargeAbsSHAP x
CountAbsSHAP 0.8340
HDBSCAN 0.5854 2499 125460
Spectral Signature 0.8631 906 45000
Isolation Forest 0.9999 6000 15362
Combined Feature
Value Selector 0.8457
HDBSCAN 0.8950 1610 120401
Spectral Signature 0.9689 904 45000
Isolation Forest 0.8030 175 13289
Table 3: Mitigation results for both LightGBM and EmberNN. All attacks were targeted towards the 17 controllable features
(see Section 6), with a 1% poison set size, 6000 backdoored benign samples. We show B-ABM for the backdoored model, and
after the defense is applied. We also include number of poisoned and goodware points filtered out by the defensive approaches.
Protecting ML systems from adversarial attacks is an in-
trinsically hard problem [17], and we argue that both the clean-
label nature of our attack, and its targeting of a highly variable
data population (benign binaries), only increase the difficulty
of the task. In the following, we empirically show that currently
available mitigations are often insufficient, and we leave a
deeper and more detailed defensive analysis for future work.
Defensive Approaches. According to our threat model, the
defender (the party who is training the malware classification
model) is assumed to: (i) Have access to the (poisoned)
training data; (ii) Have access to a small set of clean labeled
data. This common assumption in adversarial ML fits nicely
with the context since security companies often have access
to internal, trusted, data sources; (iii) Know that the adversary
will target the most relevant features for the model.
First, we evaluated if a drop in C-ABG might be used as
a signal of a poisoning campaign, but we found that this metric
cannot distinguish between adversarially crafted poison
samples and legitimate samples, particularly when stealthier
strategies, such as Combined are used. Successively, we tackle
the main obstacle making common defensive methodologies
inapplicable: the lack of a learned representation space capable
of accentuating the differences between the training data
subpopulations. To address this issue and obtain a proxy for
the latent representation space, we used the held-out, safe, data
(20% of the training set, or 120,000 samples) to train a clean
model and extract the SHAP values for the safe training set.
We then fixed a number of most important features (32) and
reduced the dimensionality of the training set to that subspace,
after standardizing all values to [−1,1].
We then evaluate three mitigation strategies over the re-
duced feature space. (i) A state-of-the-art defensive strategy,
spectral signatures [50], which we adapt by computing the sin-
gular value decomposition of the benign samples over the new
feature space. Then, as in the original paper, we compute the
outlier score by multiplying the top right singular vector and
we filter out the samples with the highest 15% scores. (ii) Hi-
erarchical density-based clustering, HDBSCAN [15]. Chen et
al. [19] use k-means for defensive clustering over neuron ac-
tivations. We mutate the idea, using HDBSCAN instead, with
the intuition that watermarked samples form a subspace of high
density in the reduced feature space, and generate a tight clus-
ter. Additionally, HDBSCAN does not require a fixed number
of clusters, but has two other parameters that control the cluster
density (minimum size of a cluster, set at 1% of the training
benign data, 3000 points, and minimum number of samples to
form a dense region, set at 0.5%, 600 points). As in [19], we
compute Silhouette scores on the resulting clusters, to obtain
an estimate of the intra-cluster similarity of a sample compared
to points from its nearest neighboring cluster, and filter out
samples from each cluster with a probability related to the clus-
ter silhouette score. (iii) Isolation Forest [32], an algorithm for
unsupervised anomaly detection, based on identifying rare and
different points, instead of building a model of a normal sample.
The intuition here is that such an anomaly detection approach
might identify the watermarked samples as outliers due to their
similarity compared to the very diverse background points. We
experiment with default parameters of Isolation Forest.
Results of Mitigation Strategies. Table 3 shows the effect of
these three mitigation strategies over the different models and
attack strategies. Two main takeaways emerge from these em-
pirical results. First, the Isolation Forest, trained on the reduced
12
feature space, is often capable of correctly isolating all the back-
doored points with relatively low false positives. Note that this
happens exclusively when an Isolation Forest is trained on the
transformed dataset (reduced to most important features). The
same algorithm applied in the original feature space detects
only a tiny fraction of the backdoored points (≈60−70), thus
reinforcing the observation in [50] that the subpopulations are
not sufficiently separable in the original feature space. Second,
none of the mitigation approaches was able to isolate the points
attacked with watermarks produced with the Combined strat-
egy. This confirms that the Combined attack strategy is much
more stealthy compared to both Independent strategies.
We note that the proposed mitigations are only a first prac-
tical step in defending against clean-label backdoor attacks
in a model-agnostic setting. We leave a deeper investigations
of more general defensive methods, as a topic of future work.
The task is extremely challenging due to the combined effect
of the small subpopulation separability induced by clean-label
attacks, and the difficulty of distinguishing dense regions
generated by the attack from other dense regions naturally
occurring in diverse sets of benign binaries.
8 Related Work
Here, we provide a quick rundown of adversarial machine
learning applied to computer security.
Evasion. Biggio et al. [11] proposed a gradient-based attack
against SVM for malicious PDF detectors by adding keywords
strongly correlated to benign files. Dang et al. [22] introduced
EvadeHC, performing a black-box attack by morphing the
malicious file using a hill-climbing approach. Xu et al. [54]
also used PDF files as target for their study, but proposed a
generalizable method to find evasive variants, in a black-box
context, using Genetic Programming. Similarly focused on
black-box mutation is the work by Anderson et al. [9], which
trains Reinforcement Learning agents to generate functionality
preserving mutations of a binary. A different line of research
is represented by Grosse et al. [25], Kolosnjaji et al. [30], and
Suciu et al. [46], who generate adversarial samples aimed at
fooling Neural Network classifiers. The first targeted networks
trained on binary value features extracted from the files, while
the second group focused on CNNs operating directly on the
raw executable binary files, like Malconv [39].
Poisoning. Biggio et al. [12] was one of the first to bring
the problem of ML poisoning attacks to light. Successive
work [14], demonstrated the relevance of poisoning attacks
in computer security by attacking the Malheur malware be-
havioral clustering tool [40]. Later research by Xiao et al. [53]
showed that feature selection methods, like LASSO, ridge
regression, and elastic net, were susceptible to small poison
sizes. Gradient-based poisoning availability attacks have been
shown against regression [27] and neural networks [38], and
the transferability of these attacks has been demonstrated [23].
Suciu et al. [47] proposed a framework for defining attacker
models in the poisoning space, and developed StingRay, a
multi-model target poisoning attack methodology.
Backdoor Attacks. Backdoor attacks were introduced by Gu
et al. in BadNets [26], identifying a supply chain vulnerability
in modern machine learning as-a-service pipelines. Liu
et al. [34] explored introducing trojan triggers in image
recognition Neural Networks, without requiring access to
the original training data, by partially re-training the models.
Later works by Turner et al. [51] and Shafahi et al. [44] further
improved over the existing attacks by devising clean-label
strategies. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has
focused on backdoor attacks aimed specifically at malicious
software classifiers. Moreover, we are not aware of any attempt
at injecting backdoors in Gradient Boosting models.
9 Discussion and Conclusion
Malware classification is an inherently hard problem that re-
quires large collections of labeled data to be confronted using
machine learning based methodologies. With this work we be-
gin shedding light on backdoor attacks, a new threat vector that
we believe will only grow in relevance in the coming years. We
demonstrated how to conduct backdoor poisoning attacks that
are model-agnostic,do not assume control over the labeling pro-
cess, and can be adapted to very restrictive adversarial models.
For instance, an attacker with the sole knowledge of the feature
space can mount a realistic attack by injecting a relatively small
pool of poisoned samples (1% of training set) and achieve high
success rate at misclassifying the backdoored malware sam-
ples. We also designed the Combined strategy that creates back-
doored points in high-density regions of the legitimate samples,
making it very difficult to detect with the explored mitigations.
There are some limitations of this work that we would like to
expose, and some concluding remarks we would like to make
hoping to increase the awareness to this kind of vulnerability.
First, the attacks we explored rely on the attacker knowing the
feature space used by the victim model. While this assumption
is partially justified by the presence of natural features in the
structure of executable files, we consider the development of
more generic attack methodologies, which do not rely on any
knowledge from the adversary’s side, as an interesting and chal-
lenging future research direction. Second, designing a general
mitigation method, particularly against our stealthy Combined
attack strategy, remains a challenging problem we leave for fu-
ture work. Lastly, adaptation of these attacks to other malware
classification problems that might rely on combining static
and dynamic analysis is also a topic of future investigation.
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Feature LightGBM EmberNN
major_image_version 1704 14
major_linker_version 15 13
major_operating_system_version 38078 8
minor_image_version 1506 12
minor_linker_version 15 6
minor_operating_system_version 5 4
minor_subsystem_version 5 20
MZ_count 626 384
num_read_and_execute_sections 20 66
num_unnamed_sections 11 6
num_write_sections 41 66
num_zero_size_sections 17 17
paths_count 229 18
registry_count 0 33
size 1202385 817664
timestamp 1315281300 1479206400
urls_count 279 141
Table 4: Watermarks for LightGBM and EmberNN used
during feasibility testing.
Dataset Label Result Count
Original
Goodware Dynamic Benign 100Dynamic Malicious 0
Malware Dynamic Benign 7Dynamic Malicious 93
LightGBM
Goodware
Failed 25
Dynamic Benign 75
Dynamic Malicious 0
Malware
Failed 23
Dynamic Benign 30
Dynamic Malicious 47
EmberNN
Goodware
Failed 33
Dynamic Benign 67
Dynamic Malicious 0
Malware
Failed 33
Dynamic Benign 23
Dynamic Malicious 44
Table 5: Summary of results analyzing a random sample
of 100 watermarked goodware and malware samples in the
dynamic analysis environment.
A Additional Results
Here the reader will find additional details on the experimental
results and feature analysis that help providing a general idea
on the effectiveness and feasibility of the studied attacks.
A.1 Feature Analysis
EMBER is comprised by 1.1 million data points composed
by 2351 vectorized features, extracted from Windows PE files.
These features capture a large portion of the semantic char-
acteristics distinguishing different executable files. Table 6
reports the full list of 35 features which are not the result of
hashing operations, with a brief description of the semantic
meaning. Highlighted are the ones we observed to be easily
controllable by an attacker using off the shelf tools. Figure 6
shows the top 20 most relevant features, for both models, based
on the SHAP contributions. As it is easy to see, many of the 35
non-hashed features, representing quite natural characteristics
of the binaries, appear among the top 20 for each model.
A.2 Attack Results
Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9 report additional experimental
results for the multiple runs of the attack with different
strategies. All the attacks were repeated for 5 times and the
tables report average results.
A.3 Feasible Backdoor Trigger
With our watermarking utility we were able to control 17
features with relative ease. Table 4 shows the feature-value
mappings for two example backdoor triggers computed on the
LightGBM and EmberNN models, which we fed to the static
and dynamic analyzers to gauge the level of label retention
after the adversarial modification. Table 5 summarizes the
results of the dynamic analyzer over 100 randomly sampled
benign and malicious executables from the EMBER dataset.
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(a) LightGBM (b) EmberNN
Figure 6: Top 20 features by SHAP contribution for each model.
Feature Description
MZ_count Number of occurrences of the string MZ. Weak evidence of a dropper or bundled executables.
avlength Average length of strings.
exports Number of exports.
has_debug File has debug section.
has_relocations File has relocations section.
has_resources File has resources section.
has_signature File is signed.
has_tls File has TLS section.
imports Number of DLL imports.
major_image_version The major version number of the image.
major_linker_version A number the size of a Byte representing the linker major version number.
major_operating_system_version The major version number of the required operating system.
major_subsystem_version A number the size of a UInt16 representing the major version number of the subsystem.
minor_image_version The minor version number of the image.
minor_linker_version A number the size of a Byte representing the linker minor version number.
minor_operating_system_version The minor version number of the required operating system.
minor_subsystem_version The minor version number of the subsystem.
num_read_and_execute_sections Number of sections having their "read" and "execute" flags set.
num_sections Total number of sections.
num_unnamed_sections Number of sections whose name is an empty null terminated string.
num_write_sections Number of sections that have their "write" flag set.
num_zero_size_sections Number of sections of size 0 bytes.
numstrings Number of strings in the binary.
paths_count Number of occurrences of strings which may contain file system paths.
printables Count of printable characters.
registry_count Number of occurrences of strings which may indicate Registry operations.
size Size of the binary in bytes.
sizeof_code Size of the code section in bytes.
sizeof_headers Size of the headers in bytes.
sizeof_heap_commit Amount of heap memory specifically allocated (committed) for use by the PE file when loaded.
string_entropy Entropy of characters across all strings.
symbols Number of symbols in the compiled object.
timestamp COFF header timestamp.
urls_count Number of occurrences of strings which may contain web URLs.
vsize Virtual size of the file.
Table 6: Manipulatable features. Descriptions from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/, and [10]
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Table 7: LargeAbsSHAP x CountAbsSHAP - All features. Average percentage over 5 runs.
Trigger
Size
Poisoned
Points
B-ABM B-GEN B-FP C-ABG
4 1500 65.8713 98.6069 0.0114 1.4308
4 3000 55.8789 98.5995 0.0116 1.4064
4 6000 40.3358 98.6081 0.0116 1.4308
4 12000 20.1088 98.6060 0.0118 1.4866
8 1500 30.8596 98.6335 0.0114 -0.1421
8 3000 10.1038 98.6212 0.0115 -0.2212
8 6000 2.8231 98.6185 0.0116 -0.0898
8 12000 0.0439 98.5975 0.0121 -0.1777
16 1500 2.4942 98.6379 0.0114 0.4714
16 3000 0.9899 98.6185 0.0114 0.5189
16 6000 0.0205 98.5948 0.0116 0.2993
16 12000 0.0138 98.6323 0.0117 0.4543
LightGBM
Trigger
Size
Poisoned
Points
B-ABM B-GEN B-FP C-ABG
16 3000 21.0122 99.0832 0.0073 99.6547
16 6000 36.7591 99.0499 0.0082 99.6420
16 12000 53.8470 99.0729 0.0079 99.6417
32 3000 13.2336 99.0608 0.0078 99.6091
32 6000 20.3952 99.1152 0.0070 99.6347
32 12000 28.3413 99.0856 0.0074 99.6187
64 3000 5.8046 99.0723 0.0084 99.4620
64 6000 11.1986 99.0959 0.0078 99.5180
64 12000 11.5547 99.0998 0.0070 99.4946
128 3000 2.4067 99.0810 0.0075 99.6016
128 6000 1.6841 99.0688 0.0075 99.5639
128 12000 2.8298 99.1088 0.0074 99.5797
EmberNN
Table 8: LargeAbsSHAP x MinPopulation - All features. Average percentage over 5 runs.
Trigger
Size
Poisoned
Points
B-ABM B-GEN B-FP C-ABG
4 1500 62.3211 98.5985 0.0115 -0.4879
4 3000 52.5933 98.6144 0.0114 -0.4688
4 6000 30.8696 98.6044 0.0116 -0.4918
4 12000 20.3445 98.5836 0.0118 -0.5474
8 1500 32.0446 98.6128 0.0114 -1.0480
8 3000 20.5850 98.6159 0.0115 -1.0288
8 6000 14.9360 98.6087 0.0115 -1.0108
8 12000 1.9214 98.6037 0.0117 -1.0206
16 1500 4.3328 98.6347 0.0114 -1.1011
16 3000 1.4490 98.6073 0.0115 -1.1479
16 6000 0.1670 98.6301 0.0115 -1.1301
16 12000 0.0026 98.6169 0.0118 -1.1378
LightGBM
Trigger
Size
Poisoned
Points
B-ABM B-GEN B-FP C-ABG
16 3000 18.8691 99.1219 0.0074 99.4353
16 6000 33.5211 99.0958 0.0079 99.4490
16 12000 50.6499 99.0942 0.0080 99.4502
32 3000 9.1183 99.1189 0.0075 50.6684
32 6000 12.1103 99.0827 0.0078 51.5356
32 12000 14.6766 99.1127 0.0071 51.7963
64 3000 3.4980 99.1170 0.0075 99.5755
64 6000 6.2418 99.1234 0.0072 99.5590
64 12000 6.8627 99.0941 0.0075 99.5271
128 3000 0.9514 99.0675 0.0082 -0.2376
128 6000 1.6012 99.0824 0.0082 -0.2640
128 12000 1.6200 99.0816 0.0074 -0.2726
EmberNN
Table 9: Greedy Combined Feature and Value Selector - All features. Average percentage over 5 runs.
Trigger
Size
Poisoned
Points
B-ABM B-GEN B-FP C-ABG
4 1500 63.3370 98.5976 0.0113 -0.4612
4 3000 60.6706 98.6320 0.0114 -0.5695
4 6000 54.3283 98.6211 0.0114 -0.5333
4 12000 40.2437 98.6099 0.0118 -0.5081
8 1500 49.5246 98.6290 0.0113 -0.6622
8 3000 37.3295 98.6153 0.0113 -0.6752
8 6000 23.6785 98.6147 0.0117 -0.7031
8 12000 17.7914 98.6282 0.0117 -0.7180
16 1500 0.8105 98.6195 0.0113 -1.1956
16 3000 0.6968 98.6170 0.0115 -1.1881
16 6000 0.0565 98.6241 0.0116 -1.1892
16 12000 0.0329 98.6173 0.0118 -1.1916
LightGBM
Trigger
Size
Poisoned
Points
B-ABM B-GEN B-FP C-ABG
16 3000 11.6613 99.1014 0.0082 -0.3118
16 6000 11.0876 99.1105 0.0078 -0.3228
16 12000 10.5981 99.0958 0.0079 -0.3165
32 3000 4.8025 99.0747 0.0087 -0.3247
32 6000 5.0524 99.1167 0.0082 -0.3241
32 12000 4.4665 99.1335 0.0072 -0.3225
64 3000 1.9074 99.1012 0.0076 -0.3179
64 6000 1.8246 99.0989 0.0077 -0.3250
64 12000 1.8364 99.1117 0.0071 -0.3217
128 3000 0.7356 99.0926 0.0082 -0.3244
128 6000 0.7596 99.1219 0.0080 -0.3256
128 12000 0.7586 99.1014 0.0072 -0.3209
EmberNN
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